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This paper asks two questions: first, how did the balance of decision-making between central and local government in welfare policy in England change between 2010 and 2015?  Second, to what extent has that led to divergence in the extent and manner of such provision?  It finds significant areas of policy where local flexibility has been increased (such as council tax benefit, crisis loans, and funding for specialist housing), either through a change in the tier of government responsible, or “unringfencing” of grants allowing local authorities greater discretion in whether to deliver particular services, although in other important areas decisions on welfare remain firmly centralised.  It also concludes that in areas where responsibility has been localised, divergence has been immediate and substantial.  Localisation may well reduce entitlements where local authorities enjoy a financial reward for so doing and political costs are low.












Scholars and policy-makers alike have long been interested in the relationship between territorial governance and the extent of welfare provision.  Specifically, the question has often been posed whether decentralised systems of government are anathema to welfare state development.  

This article seeks to shed light on this puzzle. In England between 2008 and 2015, some competences in the field of welfare policy were transferred from the central to the local level, and this piece seeks to understand, first, to what extent there was a genuine shift in the balance between central and local government, and secondly what effect change in territorial responsibility had on the extent and manner of welfare provision.  It is also noteworthy that 2008 immediately followed the global financial crisis, and thus the decision to undertake substantial reductions in public expenditure, sometimes characterised as “austerity”.  This is also an opportunity to explore the relationship between reductions in public expenditure and shifts in territorial responsibility.    

In this piece, we are concerned with the substantive transfer of political and fiscal powers from the national to the sub-national level, specifically to local government, rather than with what might be termed “administrative federalism”, which is concerned with policy implementation (a distinction elaborated by Lopez-Santana 2015).  The United Kingdom is traditionally viewed as a highly centralised polity.  That perspective has been revised since the devolution of powers to bodies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland since 1999 (although many decisions in the field of welfare policy, for instance around benefit levels and pensions, remain the preserve of the UK government in Westminster).  In the case of England, although there are some emerging regional institutions (longer established in London than elsewhere), the main sub-national actors are local authorities, who would therefore be the likely recipients of additional powers in any such change in territorial governance.  The case of England is an important one: while there have been recent analyses of changing territorial governance in contexts where strong sub-national institutions already exist (e.g. Costa-Font 2010; Del Pino and Pavolini 2015), the case of a traditionally centralised policy offers an important, distinct perspective on this question – it is plausible, for example, that in centralised polities governments are more reluctant to transfer powers downwards than they are in those where sub-national governments are already strongly established.

The paper focuses in particular on two areas of welfare policy: social housing policy and welfare benefits.  Social housing policy is assessed as an area where there is traditionally a role of local government in policy implementation, albeit within nationally set parameters, while welfare benefits are a core domain of social policy traditionally set, in England (and in fact the wider UK) by central government.  It will therefore be of value to compare responses in these different settings.  Both areas are ones we can expect to be responsive to fiscal pressures: in the case of welfare benefits, a desire to reduce government expenditure will naturally and obviously be associated with a consideration of reducing the level of benefits; decisions on that regime, in turn, will profoundly affect social housing policy (Stephens 2017).  

The analysis considers the period between 2008 (when the “global financial crisis” first hit the UK economy) and 2015.  This therefore covers two distinct national governments: from 2008 to 2010, the centre-left Labour Party was in power, and it was succeeded in 2010 by a coalition of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, which left office in 2015.  This therefore allows consideration of any partisan differences in the territorial response to public expenditure cuts.  It will draw upon a close review of public documents, as well as studies of the territorial impact of welfare to chart the extent and impact of decentralisation.  

The remainder of this piece is structured as follows.  The second section reviews recent scholarship on the impact of austerity on territorial governance, sketching out some possible findings on the relationship between the two.  The third section considers changes in this area between 2008 and 2010, in the final years of the Labour government.  The fourth section sets out, briefly, the stated policy rationale of the 2010-2015 Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government.  The fifth section examines the case of housing policy, noting that there is a trend towards local autonomy in some areas, leading to a pattern of differentiation and scaling back of entitlements.  The sixth section considers areas of benefits policy, where a territorial shift can be identified.  It is noted that only a minority of benefits policy areas are affected here, but again the trend is towards differentiation and reduction in entitlement.  The conclusion draws these strands together, noting that while the “big picture” in welfare policy is very much shaped by central government, there has been some territorial realignment, and specifically “localisation”, in England.  This has brought some differentiation in the level of entitlements.  When these changed, they reduced rather than increased, especially when the fiscal rewards for reducing them were greatest. This is linked to a desire by central government to shift blame, and an assumption that efficiency and cost-effectiveness will be strengthened.


2.	Impacts of austerity on territorial governance

As noted above, there is a significant literature about the relationship between territorial politics and welfare (for an overview, cf. Obinger et al 2005).  Rather less of this literature is specifically rooted in discussion of how reductions in public expenditure (what we might term “austerity”) may affect the territorial balance of power.  

The claim that, if decisions on welfare expenditure and levels are the responsibility of regional or local governments rather than the national government, then such expenditure and the level of provision will be lower, has often been advanced (Dowding 199, p. 770; Nelson 1987; Jin / Zou 2002; Rodden 2003).  A variety of mechanisms are held to operate here: it can be that citizens will “vote with their feet” and move away from areas with higher taxes (sometimes known as a “Tiebout effect”).  Alternatively, regional or local units of government may “race to the bottom” in terms of their level of welfare provision. In a discussion of states in the USA, Peterson (1995, p. 111) explains that ‘States may cut their welfare benefits because they fear that high benefits attract and retain the poor within their state’: he refers to anxieties amongst such states about becoming ‘welfare magnets’, and in a detailed study (ibid, pp. 108-28) found substantial evidence that this fear did indeed drive state policy in the US, with cash benefits falling by 42 percent between 1970 and 1993 (ibid, p. 127).  As he baldly puts it (ibid., p. 128):

‘To recommend that the provision of welfare should be locally controlled and its marginal cost borne by state and local taxpayers is to recommend that the poor be all but abandoned.’

This view was also reflected in an analysis of Swedish municipalities’ treatment of refugees, which found significant ‘race to the bottom’ effects in the setting of benefit levels (Dahlberg and Edmark 2008).  

However, other more recent empirical work has challenged the view that power over welfare being held below the national level is always associated with lower levels of welfare provision.  Keating (2009, p. 111) notes that ‘some devolved areas may themselves be more solidaristic than larger states’, and Jeffery (2009; Jeffery and Wincott 2010) notes that there may be a commitment, in public opinion, to nation-wide levels of provision such that a ‘race to the top’ in certain types of welfare is a possibility.  Similarly, Sellars and Lindstrom (2016, pp. 610-11) content both that powerful local government may be necessary to deliver significant welfare provision, and also that such local government may be able to mobilise political support for high levels of welfare provision.  In the same vein, Dol et al claim (2017, cited in Stephens 2017, p. 3) that retrenchment by national government could provide an incentive for bodies below the national level to introduce their own policies to assist the vulnerable (provided, of course, they have sufficient funds to make such provision).

Insofar as scholars have engaged with the relationship between austerity and territorial governance, the claim that national governments will engage in the reallocation of competences, to pass blame for unpopular decisions to the regional or local level, is prominent (Weaver 1986; Banting 2005; Costa-Font 2010; Macey 1991 cited in Whitford 2010).  This rests on an assumption (itself subject to question) that reducing welfare entitlements is an unpopular business, and by passing decisions on the “how much” and “how” of cutbacks downwards, national governments will be able to deflect popular blame for these decisions.  Most of the work cited in this discussion focuses on the regional level (or at least the level of the devolved nations in the UK), although economists do not always draw the distinction between different tiers of government below (e.g. Dahlberg and Edmark 2008, pp. 1193-4).  Some of the dynamics associated with federal systems, such as stronger senses of solidarity associated with a regional level, are rather less likely to apply to local government in a unitary system; others (such as a desire for central government to shift blame to a different tier of authority) might very well apply, as might competitive effects.  This discussion can therefore test the extent to which concerns about the impact of federalism upon welfare have any relevance for the territorial politics of welfare in more unitary setting.

Views on the desirability of decentralisation differ: economists in the tradition of Tiebout will often welcome the gains in efficiency and alignment with citizens’ preferences associated with powers being passed to local government (cf. Dowding 1994), while others are concerned at breaching what Lopez-Santana (2015) terms “the principle of interterritorial equivalency”, according to which welfare benefit entitlements are common regardless of place of residence, for instance when decentralisation hinders redistribution or solidarity across regional boundaries (Moreno and McEwen 2005, p. 14).  Inasmuch as these are competing priorities (inefficiency and alignments with local preferences on the one hand, preserving common national entitlements and solidarity on the other), we would expect parties of the right, on balance, to accord higher priority to the former, and parties of the left to allocate higher priority to the latter. Thispattern is broadly reflected in the United States, with the caveat that Southern Democrats attach higher importance to state autonomy than it would suggest (cf. Peterson and Rom 1990, p.117).  For this discussion, it will be instructive whether such partisan preferences on the desirability of decentralisation become evident.
3.	Territorial change in welfare policy between 2008 and 2010

Prior to the global financial crisis, the Labour government had apparently embraced a doctrine of “new localism”, defined by one of its key proponents as

“… a strategy aimed at devolving power and resources away from central control and towards front line managers, local democratic structures and local consumers and communities, within an agreed framework of minimum standards and policy priorities (Stoker cited in Jordan, 2007, p. 55)

Several government documents, such as the 2008 Communities in Control White Paper (DCLG 2008), the Sustainable Communities Act (2008), and the 2009 consultation on Strengthening Local Democracy (DCLG 2009), set out a desire to pass responsibility for power in England, including, potentially, areas of welfare policy.  Four key areas are particularly worth highlighting in this regard.

First, in this period, the government pursued the implementation of a framework of “Local Area Agreements” throughout England, with an agreement being put in place with each upper-tier local authority area, based upon a “Sustainable Communities Strategy” required by the government.  Each local area was required to establish a “Local Strategic Partnership” with local authority and wider stakeholder representation; it would then adopt a series of up to 35 targets, along with some 17 education and early years targets, to be negotiated with the regional government office, and chosen from a new national set of indicators.  Upon agreement of these targets, some additional funding could be released, and the co-operation of relevant government departments, such as the Department for Work and Pensions, and the Department of Children, Schools and Families, would be assured (cf. HM Government 2007).  

Secondly, the government commissioned a report by the leader of Barnsley Council, Stephen Houghton, on the role of local authorities in tackling worklessness (Houghton 2009).  This led to the decision to establish a “Future Jobs Fund” of over £1 billion, where local authorities would be involved in the commissioning of a fund to subsidise job creation for young people, and the promise of greater partnership working with central government agencies, notably the Department for Work and Pensions.  As the government response to the Houghton Report noted, this was not unconditional decentralisation:

 “In arriving at this offer we have been careful to balance the devolution of increased powers and funding with clear requirements for partnerships to demonstrate an understanding of the nature of worklessness in their areas; to develop robust plans to tackle this and to demonstrate that further devolution will improve outcomes locally.  This offer is made on a something for something basis” (DCLG 2009, p.8, emphasis in original)

In both these instances, therefore, there is no major reallocation of political or fiscal competence in these areas: the government would not allow a challenge to the principle of “interterritorial equivalency”.  Instead, decisions on the management of programmes and targeted local interventions represented the outer limits of decentralisation in this period.  

Third, in the area of social housing policy, a couple of changes are worth highlighting.  In December 2009, the government introduced new guidance in social housing guidance to local authorities (DCLG 2009a).  Although this did not amend statutory requirements for local authorities to give “reasonable preference” in social housing allocation to particular groups (such as those who are homeless or overcrowded), it reinforced the ability of local authorities to adopt local priorities alongside the nationally mandated ones, and take into account factors such as waiting time and local connection in allocating housing.  In practice, given the limited number of allocations becoming available in any area, as well as the financial imperative to limit numbers in temporary accommodation, this was of limited significance.  

One concrete change, in this area of policy, was the decision to “unringfence” Supporting People funding, a stream of income received by upper-tier local authorities to pay for housing-related support, for instance of homeless hostels.  From 2009 onwards, local authorities were no longer required to spend this grant on particular services, a decision taken following the piloting of such an approach the previous year.  The responsible minister, Sadiq Khan, pointed to the “flexibility” of such an approach, notwithstanding the concerns of some service providers (House of Commons 2012, p. 17).  The effects of this change were felt in the following legislative period.  Similarly, the government proposed changing rules around council house finance, such that, in return for local authorities with their own housing stock making a one-off payment towards notional historic housing debt, they would be able to retain rental income from council houses (House of Commons 2013).  This would be a significant change, as hitherto a significant chunk of income was “top sliced” by government for other purposes, and the rest was subject to redistribution between local authorities.  This was intended to allow local authorities greater flexibility in the construction and management of council housing, though it would not give them autonomy on rent-setting (with the range of rents chargeable continuing to be steered nationally), disposals of stock (with rules around “right to buy” set centrally, and agreement required for sale of major assets), or allocations.  

In sum, there was no radical change in the territorial balance of welfare policy in England between the global financial crisis of 2008 and the departure of the Labour government from office in 2010.  There was an increasing emphasis on “partnership” between different strands of public services, national and local, in which local authorities would be able to collaborate with government department in the delivery of particular initiatives – but this was favoured over greater local autonomy.  Only at the margins, with minor changes to social housing allocations guidance, or the “unringfencing” of Supporting People funding, was there a shift in responsibility from the national to the local level.

4.	A change in the ethos of localism: the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 2010-2015

The election of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government of 2010 saw a significant shift in the approach to “localism”.  Clayton et al (2016, p. 724) point to four significant differences compared to Labour’s localism, referring to the demise of the region (in England) as a focus of sub-national activity, a reduction in central government’s regulatory functions, the demise of “partnership” models of governance, and a far greater level of funding reductions, particularly of local government.  This new variety of localism has three key elements: first, the “empowerment” of local communities, with the expanded policy competence for local government, but with reduced funding, making it susceptible to being blamed for service reduction.

The government made a number of immediate changes in this area.  In October 2010, the government abolished the “Local Area Agreement” framework, suggesting this would save money on “bean counters” and that control should be handed to “councils and their voters” (DCLG 2010).    It launched a major piece of legislation, the “Localism Bill”, in December 2010, becoming law the following year.  The Secretary of State, Eric Pickles, stated that this would 

“… herald a ground-breaking shift in power to councils and communities overturning decades of central control and starting a new era of people power.  … By getting out of the way and letting councils and communities run their own affairs we can restore civic pride, democratic accountability and economic growth. … It’s the end of the era of big government: laying the foundations for the Big Society” (DCLG 2010a).

Here, the motifs that scholars identify – of the view that central and local power are a “zero sum” game, that empowerment of local authorities may go hand in hand with reducing the scope of state power, and that state activity “crowds out” civic engagement, are clearly visible.  If this rhetoric is to be believed, the 2010 to 2015 period would see some change in the intergovernmental organisation of this policy area, with power shifting from the national to local level.

This rhetoric in support of decentralisation was accompanied by a dramatic reduction in local authority funding over the 2010 to 2015 period.  Overall, the Institute for Fiscal Studies found that local government spending fell by 20.4% after accounting for economy-wide inflation (Innes and Tetlow 2015, p. 1).  The level of cuts was the subject of national variation: specifically, areas previously more reliant upon government grants (those where need for spending was assessed to be greater than revenue-raising capacity) were more affected, with cuts ranging from 6.2% to 46.3% per person (ibid., p. 2).  It has been noted that, broadly, poorer areas, who had the greatest number of citizens reliant on welfare, were therefore more exposed to reductions in spending than their more prosperous counterparts (Watt 2014).









On the finance of affordable housing, there were a number of changes introduced by the coalition government, which had some impact upon the balance between national and local government.  The reforms proposed under the previous government to council house finance, under which councils would keep their rental income after payment of historic housing debt, were indeed implemented (as part of the Localism Act 2011).  The terms of implementation were slightly less advantageous to councils, and more so to central government, with a change in the “discount rate” used to value councils’ housing businesses, leading to an increased receipt for the government (House of Commons 2013, pp. 28-9), and, most significantly, the inclusion of significant caps upon councils’ ability to borrow against their housing assets.  This cap was justified by reference to the fact that such borrowing would be included in the calculation of the national Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (House of Commons 2015, pp.5-7).  Nonetheless, the reform did enable councils to set their own priorities – most commonly, amongst councils surveyed for a study in in 2013, they wished to prioritise the construction of new council housing (71% of those surveyed), with some 20,000 to 25,000 units expected as a result; others chose to prioritise regeneration (46%) and “green” measures (39%) (ARCH 2013, p. 6).​[2]​

b.	Changes to affordable housing rents

The government also, as part of the Localism Act, made some changes to tenancy law.  The most significant was the introduction of the “Affordable Rent” model, announced by the government as part of the funding prospectus for those bidding for capital grants from its Homes and Communities Agency.  This allowed new build “affordable” housing to have rents of up to 80% of the market level, rather than the lower rents previously required of “social housing”, often equating to around 40% of the market level (House of Commons 2015a).  In his announcement of the programme, Housing Minister Grant Shapps stated that the programme would “make public subsidy go further while also enabling local authorities and providers to target support where it is most needed” (DCLG 2011).  In part, this was a straightforward “trade” for government, offering lower levels of capital grant to providers of affordable housing (whether housing associations or local authorities) while apparently maintaining the number of “affordable” completions, with the extra revenue cost associated with the higher rents either paid for by tenants themselves, or through housing benefit.  It also offered providers of social housing, whether councils or housing associations, the ability to “churn” existing stock to affordable rent, in agreement with their regulators, and utilise the extra income, for instance to support housing development.  This modification (in fact, of the sort sometimes urged by OECD and the European Commission on countries in order to promote the efficiency of public rent subsidy) might have involved a modest territorial adjustment, but this should not be overstated: the government was clear that councils and housing associations which did not embrace this new model “should expect to see fewer schemes funded in their area” (Inside Housing, 30th January 2014).

c.	Changes to tenancy law
	
Along with changes to policy on rent, an extra flexibility was introduced for councils in the Localism Act, following consultation under the government’s paper Local Decisions: A fairer future for social housing (DCLG 2010b).  Councils and housing associations would be able to offer time-limited, rather than lifetime tenancies, enabling them to be ended if the tenant was no longer considered to be in need of that particular type of tenancy (and as part of that consideration, councils were obliged to publish a “Tenancy Strategy”).  The government explained that: “Localism, fairness and focusing social housing on those most in need … are at the heart of our proposed reforms” (ibid. p. 17).  Just as with the previous change, this appeared to combine decentralisation of power (in this case, the decision on the appropriate length of tenancy to offer) with a change in the character of this feature of the welfare state – social housing would, under the new tenancies, be more tightly focused at those in acute housing need, a change sometimes referred to as “residualisation”.  However, the change did not lead to the wholesale change in tenancy policy that the government might have wished for: in 2013/14, only 9% of new social lettings were on a time-limited basis, rising to 13% in 2014/15 (DCLG 2015, p.8), and it was found that scepticism of the new model was particularly prevalent amongst Labour councils, and some social housing providers (House of Commons 2016, pp. 10-11).

d.	Further changes in housing policy

Three other shifts in power in housing are also worthy of mention.  First, the government in the Localism Act allowed councils to restrict access to their social housing waiting lists, so that those without a local connection could be excluded (whereas previously, while they might stand no chance of accessing social housing, as allocations policies would usually provide those with a local connection with greater priority).  The number on waiting lists peaked in England at 1.85 million in 2012, falling to 1.24 million in 2015 (House of Commons 2016a, p. 17). The majority of councils taking part in a recent survey had indeed taken steps to remove those without a local connection, often of several years standing, from their waiting lists.  

Secondly, the government legislated, again as part of the Localism Act, to change the way in which councils were able to “discharge” a duty to a homeless person.  This is a rather complicated area of legislation – simply put, if someone is “unintentionally homeless” and falls into one of a number of “priority need” categories (such as having young dependents, being pregnant, or vulnerable), the local council has a duty towards that person and a responsibility to find appropriate accommodation, while making available temporary accommodation in the meantime.  Prior to the 2011 Act, such a person could insist that, after being in temporary accommodation, only a council or housing association tenancy would be acceptable, but the Act enabled councils, instead, to “discharge the duty” into privately rented accommodation.  In effect, this increased the options for local authorities to make arrangements for homeless people, while reducing the choices available for homeless households themselves.  The most recent statistical release (for October to December 2015) showed that, of 10,340 households where the main homeless duty was ended who had been in temporary accommodation, 7,000 (68%) were provided with accommodation in a local authority or housing association property, while 380 (4%) accepted an offer in the private rented sector, with a further 60 turning that offer down (DCLG 2016, p. 12).  This probably under-states the extent of the impact of the change, however, as the ability of councils to discharge the duty into the private rented sector, rather than a property with a far lower, social rent, discourages applicants from presenting as homeless.





What, then, does this overview of housing change tell us about the relationship between decentralisation and welfare policy?  First, there can be no question about the desired direction of government policy.  There is a clear shift in government policy towards sub-market housing being a more targeted resource, with higher rents (subsidised where necessary by housing benefit) and shorter tenancies, and with local authorities being able to have greater flexibility in who they supported with accommodation, and in what way.  Nonetheless, there were significant elements of discretion. Local authorities were able to continue to offer lower rents (unless higher rents were a condition of government grants), accept everyone onto social housing waiting lists, offer permanent social tenancies, and indeed spend as much money as they wished on supported housing.  Undoubtedly, this slowed the pace of change, notably in the areas (such as tenancy length) where there would be no fiscal impact upon local authorities in sticking with previous arrangements.  But in each area we see a gradual shift in the direction anticipated by government policy.  Table 1 sets this out below, and also attempts to summarise the fiscal impacts and political consequences of a local authority using its new flexibilities.  It can be discerned (and is in any case intuitive) that the presence of a strong fiscal incentive, or a political incentive (in the case of social housing allocations, where a strong local connections policy will find favour with voters enjoying such a connection themselves) is likely to see the more extensive adoption of such local flexibilities.

Table 1 about here

 Because most of the flexibilities only gave local authorities the ability to reduce entitlements, and of course because the changes were introduced at a time of severe funding cuts to local authorities, there is little evidence of localism being used to “scale up” entitlements.  The one exception to this is in the embrace of self-financing of council housing to invest in new and existing stock, as part of this (locally ring-fenced) account.  Even here, such investment (specifically in new stock) might also bring a fiscal return to the local authority, both in increased rental income and reduced temporary accommodation costs.





As noted in the introduction, policy towards welfare benefits is, for the most part, maintained nationally.  There have been calls for localisation – for instance, Essex County Council argued in 2008 that it should be allowed to determine the “eligibility criteria and amounts payable for all working age benefits (DCLG 2008, p. 94), while the think tank IPPR called for extensive “localisation” in the area of housing benefit (Cooke / Hull 2012).  However, thus far such territorial shifts have been quite limited.  It is particularly significant that the single biggest reform of welfare policy in England, the introduction of a new, simplified working age benefit called “Universal Credit”, in fact involves a degree of reconcentration, as it shifts responsibility for housing costs, previously paid out as housing benefit by local authorities, to the Department for Work and Pensions.   





The most substantial change in this area was that, as part of the Comprehensive Spending Review in October 2010, the Government announced that it would seek to reduce expenditure on Council tax benefit by 10% from 2013/14, and that it would be accompanied by a measure of ‘localisation’, so that local authorities could design their own schemes of council tax benefit (HM Treasury 2010, p. 50).  Further details were announced in a consultation launched by the Department for Communities and Local Government in August 2011 (DCLG 2011a).  Council tax benefit was a locally-administered benefit, funded entirely by central government, which met the cost of council tax (a local tax on property) for certain defined groups, essentially those on lower incomes (with eligibility criteria broadly aligned to housing benefit, and thus falling squarely within the national welfare state).  The government decided to allow local authorities the flexibility to devise their own benefit schemes; they would be eligible to retain any money they saved as a result of reducing entitlements (starting, of course, with recouping the 10% funding cut).  Local authorities would face some constraints: notably, they will be required to provide continued benefits according to a national standard for pensioners and other vulnerable groups, but they will be able to vary levels of council tax benefit for other groups.  They also gained some flexibilities in the ability to charge council tax on empty properties.

Although the announcement of the change in the Comprehensive Spending Review would suggest a primarily fiscal motivation for this change, the government’s consultation paper also suggests a motivation concerned providing incentives for efficiency:

‘The Government has decided to localise support for council tax to give local authorities a greater stake in the economic future of their local area, and so supporting the Government’s wider agenda to enable stronger, balanced economic growth across the country. ... [Also to] give local authorities a financial stake in the provision of support for council tax. This reform will create stronger incentives for councils to get people back into work.’ (ibid, p. 10)

The effectiveness of the latter incentive might be questioned – levels of unemployment are not, principally, within the control of local government.  As a result, the main way in which a local authority could gain a financial advantage from varying council tax benefit would be to reduce the level of provision: this would not only free up funds for other purposes, but might also serve to encourage the displacement of working-age recipients of the benefit.  This is precisely the concern which leads Peterson (1995, p. 192) to argue for US federalism to determine welfare policy at the national level, or at least ensure that states do not achieve a competitive advantage by cutting benefits.

Initially (and perhaps rather at odds with the government’s policy rationale – we might speculate as a compromise with the Conservatives’ smaller coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats), the government made available £100 million in funding for local authorities who did not make extensive changes to their schemes; this came to an end in 2013/14.

The implications of the decision to localise the benefit are extremely clear – there is now a wide variety of council tax reduction schemes, but the majority of local authorities has chosen to reduce entitlements compared to the old council tax benefit.  Of 326 local authorities, 58 retained all the features of council tax benefit in 2013/14, 45 in 2014/15 and 42 in 2015/16.  From April 2015, 250 councils will require all citizens to pay something towards their council tax, regardless of income, with such minimum contributions ranging from 5% to 30%.  2.3 million households had been adversely affected by the change, with the average reduction for those affected being £145 in the first year, £160 in the second year, and £167 in the third year (NPI 2015, pp. 1-2).  The only slight caveat to this picture is that a handful of councils chose, in 2015/16, to ameliorate the impact of decisions previously taken, for instance by disregarding child maintenance payments, or introducing a hardship fund (ibid. p. 1).  Interestingly, one local authority, Sandwell, was forced to amend its scheme after a legal challenge, when it attempted to apply a “local connection” policy to the payment, requiring two years’ residency before it could be applied (House of Commons 2015, pp. 17-18).

b.	Local replacement of the “Social Fund”

The second significant change was in the decision to abolish the “Social Fund”, a range of discretionary grants and loans offered to those on low incomes who had to meet exceptional items of expenditure, and, under the Welfare Reform Act 2012, switch responsibility to single and upper-tier local authorities, who would be responsible for designing their own local schemes, and paid an unringfenced grant for doing so (House of Commons 2012).  In explaining the rationale, the government pointed to the need for local flexibility, with Steve Webb, the Minister responsible, stating “You [local authorities] need to be able to flex the provision in a way that is suitable and appropriate to meet the needs of your local communities” (SSAC 2015, p. 12).  

Research by the DWP (2014) found that there was a variety of practice – for instance, in choosing what to fund, whether to make payments in cash or through payment cards, and whether to administer the scheme “in house” or involve an alternative provider.  However, it found that 80% of local authorities who replied to its survey did not spend all the funds allocated to them in 2013/14 (ibid, p. 21); the SSAC found that 86% of the available money was budgeted in 2014/15 (so some had been removed from budgets entirely).  An analysis by Gibbons was scathing: 

“Overall, there can be no doubt that there has been a significant reduction in the amount of financial help being made available … since 2010.  … This was initiated through the imposition of restrictions [on the national scheme prior to 2013] … and has been continued as a result of pursuing the policy of devolved funding to local authorities without placing them under any statutory requirement to provide effective local welfare schemes or ring-fencing the budget for these (Gibbons 2015, p. 104).

He finds that around half the initial allocation of funds went unspent, around a third of local authorities spent less than 40% of their allocation on direct financial assistance to vulnerable people in 2013/14, and there was a 75% reduction in the number of awards made (ibid. p. 104).  The House of Commons Work and Pensions Select Committee expressed particular concern at the use of “local connection” requirements to access funds from these schemes (House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, 2016).


c.	Expansion of “Discretionary Housing Payments”

As part of its fiscal consolation, the government introduced a range of measures to reduce the level of housing benefit entitlements – for instance, rents payable in the private rented sector would be reduced from the 50th to the 30th percentile of properties in a given area; households of working age “under-occupying” social housing would face a benefit reduction, and the overall level of benefits paid to a household would be capped.  However, these were mitigated by significant increases in the level of “Discretionary Housing Payment” (DHP), a sum paid to single and lower-tier local authorities to make payments to households experiencing temporary and unbridgeable shortfalls.  In 2011/12, core funding of £20 million for DHP was supplemented with an additional £10 million to mitigate housing benefit reductions, and this rose to £165 million by 2014/15, of which £20 million was core funding, and £145 million was for specific impacts of government policies (ibid. p. 6).  It is worth noting that how funds are allocated, and on what criteria, is a matter for local authorities, and any guidance is not binding (SSAC 2015, p. 15).  Local authorities are not required to spend this money, although it is ring-fenced and underspends must be returned to the DWP.  They are allowed, however, to supplement it from their own funds.  In 2013/14, the majority (240 of 380 local authorities) underspent by a total of £13.3 million (7.4% of the total), while 127 spent above their allocation by £16.7 million (ibid. p. 16).  










What overall assessment can, therefore, be made of these various “localising” initiatives between 2010 and 2015?  Firstly, they should not be over-stated: most instruments of welfare policy remain firmly in the control of central government, and indeed the introduction of Universal Credit will shift the balance towards centralisation further.  Secondly, there has been some transfer of political power from the national to the local level. As with the section on housing, where there has been genuine localisation (in the case of council tax support and local welfare assistance) there has been a shift towards patchy retrenchment, with differentiation between local authorities being both clear and pronounced.  In similar terms as in the foregoing section, this is summarised in table 2 below:

Table 2 about here






The paper has considered changes in territorial responsibility for welfare policy in the areas of housing policy and welfare benefits.  

There are two significant concluding points which need to be made at the outset.  First, the welfare system in the United Kingdom (and specifically in England) remains highly centralised, with much administration being the responsibility of central government agencies, and decisions on the nature and level of entitlements for the most part being the responsibility of central government.  Secondly, it is not necessarily the case that territorial reconfiguration need follow a financial crisis – as the second section of this paper demonstrated, the territorial rebalancing under the Labour government between 2008 and 2010 was modest indeed.  

However, this discussion has shown that there was some trend towards extending the level of responsibility held by local government between 2010 and 2015.  In both housing policy and welfare policy, local government found itself gaining autonomy.  In the case of housing policy, this tended to be towards an ability to vary rules and use flexibilities in a direction the government welcomed (higher rents, lower security of tenure, building houses).  In the case of welfare policy, in two discrete areas of policy (council tax benefit and local welfare assistance), there was a substantial increase in local autonomy, and in both those cases, as with some aspects of housing policy, variation has been immediate and substantial.  The tentative suggestion that a government of the centre-left would be more resistant to eroding the “principle of interterritorial equivalency” than one of the centre right appears to be confirmed.
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Table 1: Change in housing policy as a result of “localism” 2010-15 – author’s assessment
Area of policy	Extent of change	Fiscal reward for change	Political impact of change​[3]​
Adoption of affordable rent	Widely adopted for new dwellings	High	Neutral / negative (low profile, unpopular with tenants affected compared to social rent)
Adoption of “flexible tenancies”	Limited adoption for new tenancies (c. 13%)	Low	Neutral / negative (low profile, unpopular with new tenants)
Restricting access to housing waiting lists to local applicants	Majority have adopted restrictions	Low	Beneficial (local priority popular with local residents)
Discharge of homeless duties to private rented sector	Quite widely adopted alongside other instruments	High	Neutral (low profile, relatively low numbers affected)
Funding for housing-related support	Very substantial reductions in funding	High	Neutral / negative (quite low profile but hostel reductions unpopular)

Table 2: Change in welfare policy as a result of “localism” 2010-15 – author’s assessment
Area of policy	Extent of change	Fiscal reward for change	Political impact of change
Council tax support	Reductions in entitlements in 87% of local authorities by 2015/16 	High	Medium (large number affected but low prominence)
Local welfare assistance	Reductions in spent and entitlements, approximately 75% fewer awards in first year	Medium	Low (low number affected, low prominence)









^1	  This is not to suggest that all occupants of social housing fall into such a category of disadvantage, but simply that the provision of housing, provided at costs below the market level, forms part of a country’s welfare settlement.	
^2	  The ability to do this was heavily compromised by the decision in 2015 to reduce social housing rents, undermining councils’ business planning assumptions, but that falls outside the timeframe of this paper.
^3	  This is the author’s assessment.  In most cases, the “political impact” (that is, whether a change has a high public profile and whether it is popular) is fairly limited as only small proportions of the population are going to be affected.  A possible exception is in the case of social housing waiting lists, due to the large number of people either on a waiting list themselves, or having a family member on such a list.
